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provision, is increasingly shaped by attempts to embed social facets into 
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COMPARATIVE REGULATORY REGIMES IN WATER 
SERVICE DELIVERY: EMERGING CONTOURS OF 
GLOBAL WATER WELFARISM? 
Bronwen Morgan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of scarce water resources has emerged as a global policy 
issue of significant prominence over the past five to ten years. In 
particular, access to water understood broadly has arguably become a 
flashpoint issue for debates over the social dimensions of globalisation. In 
popular discourse, this debate focuses on whether a ‘human face’ to 
globalisation can be successfully crafted at the transnational level, or 
whether globalisation needs to be rolled back, and distributive and equality 
issues can be tackled within national boundaries. This paper explores a 
very specific dimension of the broader question of access to water: 
namely, the delivery of water services to ordinary citizens in urban 
contexts for domestic use. Rather than focusing on water resources 
(irrigation, cross-border river basins, etc), it narrows its lens to the 
question of access to sufficient clean water for domestic human use.1 This 
is perhaps the most urgent ‘social’ question within global water policy 
debates, as 1.2 billion people worldwide still lack access to minimal 
amounts of safe drinking water, though the seventh Millenium 
Development Goal hopes to halve this number by 2015. Of course, the 
provision of access to domestic drinking water is intimately linked to the 
quantity and quality of water resources more broadly, which are under 
pressure – some would say in crisis (Davis 2007) – from rapid 
urbanization in developing countries, from degraded infrastructure in 
developed countries and from pollution in both settings. But the angle of 
* Professor of Sociolegal Studies, University of Bristol, UK, email
B.Morgan@bristol.ac.uk 
1 The focus is also on urban rather than rural contexts, meaning that the analysis largely 
excludes issues pertaining to water needed for subsistence food provision. 
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analysis for present purposes is upon the delivery of essential services and 
not on the larger ecological picture.  
 
The key transnational actors in this particular aspect of access to water 
debates are i) international and regional financial institutions who fund the 
provision of water services on the assumption of a certain model of 
delivery; ii) multinational companies from the UK and France wishing to 
invest in foreign markets; and iii) institutions for dispute resolution, 
particularly international arbitration forums and potentially the World 
Trade Organisation under the auspices of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Services. In the 1990s, transnational markets for water services 
delivery developed, led by by British and French companies. Suez 
(Ondeo), Vivendi (Veolia) and Thames are the three largest water service 
operators globally in absolute terms as well as in terms of foreign 
investment. These multinational companies entered into transnational 
contracts with national or local authorities that, in turn, often provided for 
international arbitration. The most important domestic actors for the 
purposes of this paper are regulatory agencies and organised social groups 
who contribute citizen and consumer perspectives – sometimes hostile – to 
the institutional innovation of the agency. Both the regulatory agencies 
and the organised social groups have transnational epistemic communities 
that support their goals, but for the most part, these networks have not 
played a causal role in the events explored in this paper. Rather, they are 
networks whose transnational strength and depth are constituted by the 
events. This is an important facet of the findings in this paper: that 
transnational transformations are a product of the local and often not – or 
not only – an effect of external influences on a state.  
 
This growth of a transnational dimension to water services provision – 
particularly marked in the 1990s but still highly politically salient – has 
led to both resistance and routinisation. Activists’ challenge to market-led 
capitalism is summed up in the cry of ‘water is a human right, not a 
commodity’. In response, water provision, as with many other areas of 
collective provision, is increasingly shaped by attempts to embed social 
facets into the expansion of transnational markets: part of the incremental 
growth of ‘globalisation with a human face’. In this way, the delivery of 
essential services has become an arena for struggles over distributive 
justice, a site for social policy just as much as for economic or industrial 
policy (Dubash 2005), rooted in what could be called ‘the politics of 
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necessity’ (Morgan and Trentmann 2006). In particular, the increasingly 
transnational dimensions of water services delivery and its associated 
policy debates mean that the politics of necessity are embedded in North-
South tensions typical of a range of issues in contemporary global political 
economy. I would suggest that the narrative of this paper is emblematic of 
potential trajectories of transnational regulatory politics in areas beyond 
water, most obviously other public utilities such as gas and electricity, but 
also health and education. In other words, the issue of access to water is in 
effect a case study that exemplifies the regulatory dimensions of a debate 
over whether it is possible to integrate social policy effectively into global 
governance.  
 
This paper tests the expectation that similar regulatory dynamics might be 
expected to emerge in response to transnational influences on the domestic 
delivery of water services, and finds that on the contrary, national 
variations remain deeply embedded. This is illustrated with reference to 
the dynamics of domestic (national-level) regulation of access to water 
issues in Chile, Bolivia and Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Institutions that regulate essential services have emerged and spread 
widely since the 1990s (Levi-Faur) in the context of a relatively strong 
international mainstream consensus about their shape and purpose that I 
call a ‘transactional’ model of regulation. This consensus is embedded in 
strong transnational epistemic communities specialising in the technical 
aspects of regulation, and arguably, a noticeable imitation effect, 
(particularly in Latin America where the case studies explored here are all 
located). Against this, the strategic and cultural centrality of access to 
water might well lead national and local governments to focus strongly on 
retaining national or local control: an orientation which fits more closely 
with a ‘political’ model of regulation. 
 
The findings of this paper indicate that in each of the three case studies, 
control is in fact partially ceded to semi-independent regulatory 
institutions that strongly resemble the institutional recommendations of the 
transnational consensus. But an exploration of the implementation 
dynamics of these institutions, focused on a time in each of conflict and 
disputing, reveals significant national differences. In Bolivia, the role 
played by the regulator in each case is coherent with the: transactional 
model but is politically marginalised; in Chile, a strongly transactional 
regulator maintains political salience, and in Argentina, a more political 
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model of regulation is erratically salient. These differences can be 
explained by integrating political dimensions at two levels which the 
transactional model of regulation either sidesteps or demonises. The first 
level is that of contingent events at the macro-level: thus Bolivia has 
experienced a social and political revolution of sorts over the period 
studied, while Argentina has experienced an economic crisis and a divided 
state, and Chile remains a stable, depoliticized, investment-friendly 
context. At a related, but more micro, level, the political context in each 
country varies, particularly the strength of the social groups that contest 
the transactional model of regulation promoted by the dominant 
transnational epistemic community. These two levels interact to suggest 
that there are two broad competing models of global governance that 
shape domestic regulatory dynamics, both of which stem from a mix of 
local, national and transnational influences: The first, managed 
liberalisation, has been dominant thus far, but the second, a reinvigorated 
image of public provision that stresses participatory democracy rather than 
bureaucratic state involvement (Morgan 2006a), is gaining prominence.  
 
Figure 1 summarises the operational roles of the regulator in each case 
study with particular reference to the role of transnational influences. 
Figure 2 summarises key aspects of the broader political context which 
help to explain the variation illustrated in Figure 1. The remainder of this 
paper will flesh out these tables in three parts. First, I outline the contours 
of global water welfarism and in particular the place of regulation within 
those contours. Second, I explore the reverberations of ‘missing politics’ 
in the three case studies of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. Finally, the paper 
concludes by highlighting the implications of the case studies for our 
understanding of transnational transformations of the state.  
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Figure 1: Operational comparison of national regulatory dynamics  
     Bolivia    Chile    Argentina 
Catalyst for private 
sector participation 
(PSP) 
Social goals and 
international pressure 
(IADB) 
Economic goals and 
international incentives 
(WTO) 
President Menem’s 
reforms 
Timing and level of 
government 
Just before PSP 
Central 
9 years before PSP 
Central govt 
With PSP 
Provincial 
Role and texture of 
regulator 
Basic technical expertise, 
inadequate legal 
structure, independent  
Expert technocracy, low 
discretion, relatively 
independent 
Low on expertise, played 
populist role 
International 
arbitration?  
Yes No Yes 
Overall Some formal technical 
capacity from a 
transactional 
perspective; politically 
marginalised 
Formal and substantive 
transactional capacity; 
politically salient 
Politicised; salient when 
catalysed by 
ombudsman 
 
Figure 2: Contextual comparison of national regulatory dynamics  
 Bolivia (transactional 
but marginalised) 
Chile (transactional and 
politically salient) 
Argentina 
(politicised but – 
erratically – salient) 
Key focus of broad 
regulatory dynamics 
Legislative framework 
for water resources 
broadly: irrigation, 
mining 
Procurement policies, tariff-
setting and accounting 
processes, mergers 
Legislation mandating 
social tariffs 
‘Main action’ Popular politics and mass 
mobilisation, legislative 
negotiations  
Legalised power struggles 
between major interests;  
limited, ineffective party 
politics 
Mix of party politics and 
popular action, and small 
claims lawsuits 
Principal source of 
rich data 
Deliberative and 
participatory drafting; 
social control of 
company 
Regulator-company disputes 
within regulator and in court 
Ombudsman-court-
regulator sequence 
Implicit social 
imaginary 
Politically driven local 
development 
Legalistic public interest ‘Popcorn’ 
incrementalism’ 
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II. REGULATION IN THE SHADOW OF GLOBAL WATER 
WELFARISM 
 
The structure of global water policy is complex, but can be presented for 
present purposes as a simplified model that focuses on the regulation, 
provision and policymaking environment of urban water services.2 There 
are no formal international institutions responsible for the regulation of 
water services at the global level. Moreover although transnational 
companies are involved in the provision of water services, from a formal 
perspective and especially from a perspective of legal rights and 
obligations, water service delivery is still deeply embedded in national 
domestic structures and institutions. It is also important to note that in 
terms of volume provision is also still overwhelmingly embedded in state 
structures: public operators deliver 95% of networked water services. 
Where access to water is limited, small-scale private independent 
operators (ranging from individual water vendors to low-technology 
neighbourhood systems) dominate. But large private corporations are 
increasingly involved in water services delivery, including on a cross-
border basis (Leclerc & Raes, 2001; Silva, Tynan, & Yilmaz, 1998). An 
extraordinary 7,300% increase on 1974–1990 private sector investment in 
water sanitation occurred between 1990 and 1997. This has since declined 
to an absolute level of half the 1997 peak, totalling 11% of all water and 
sanitation investments (Simpson, 2005:15). But the political salience of 
the regulatory framework for commercial deliver of water services is 
unlikely to be diluted. For even if the withdrawal of multinational 
corporations from cross-border contracts turns out to be neither partial nor 
temporary, it is unlikely to change the pressure coming from financial 
institutions that lend money to large infrastructure projects to restructure 
service provision along commercial lines.3 
                                                 
2 In a forthcoming publication (Morgan 2007), I argue that global water welfarism 
operates in three dimensions: fiscal, administrative and legitimation, all embedded in a 
tightly woven complex between Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans, Millenium 
Development Goals and public-private partnership structures. 
3 The most recent instantiations of these heated debates have moved beyond dichotomous 
discussions of ‘public vs private’and focus on complex ranges of mixed public-private 
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Developments that privilege private and transnational structures are even 
more pronounced in relation to policymaking functions than they are in 
relation to provision. Both intergovernmental (Dublin Statement, 1992; 
European Commission, 2004; UN, 1978, 2000, 2005) and hybrid public-
private fora have emerged as sites for debates over access to water and for 
the formulation of influential position papers on key issues. The most 
prominent hybrid forum is the tri-annual World Water Forum, hosted by 
the World Water Council, which is legally a French-based NGO but in 
practice a transnational organisation composed of a curious amalgam of 
business-based NGOs and large corporations.4 Each World Water Forum 
(the most recent was in Mexico in 2006) generates principles and policy 
documents for guiding water governance, emphasizing such core issues as 
‘full cost recovery’ in a heavily iterative fashion. Though not a UN-
sponsored event, each World Water Forum also hosts a formal 
intergovernmental Ministerial Meeting. The UN has also created a 
Millennium Task Force on Water and Sanitation that will identify the best 
strategies for halving the number of people worldwide lacking access to 
water.  
 
The combination of developments in policymaking and provision is 
creating the nascent outlines of a transnational institutional dimension to 
urban water services delivery. This development is deeply politically 
contested. Two broad models could be said to be competing: managed 
liberalisation on the one hand, and on the other, a reinvigorated image of 
public provision that stresses participatory democracy rather than 
bureaucratic state involvement (Morgan 2006a). Importantly, both models 
are influenced by a blend of local, national and transnational rules and 
institutions, and both stress the importance of social objectives in the 
context of the harsh distributional effects of globalising market forces. In 
other words, there is no necessary link between managed liberalisation and 
the increased involvement of transnational actors and institutions, nor 
between participatory democracy and local or national actors. In either 
                                                                                                                         
structures for the delivery of water services: see in particular Water Operator Partnership 
(WOP) initiatives. 
4 Members include Suez, Severn Trent, Vivendi, Mitsubishi, Evian, Electricite de France, 
Japan Dam Engineering Centre, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 
US Army Corps of Engineers. 
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case, domestic regulatory institutions are a crucial part of the picture. 
Regulation is a core aspect of the political contestation over the different 
models, precisely because it is salient on both sides of the dichotomy of 
‘water as a human right’ versus ‘water as a commodity’ (Morgan 2005). 
Thus whether state or private provision is envisaged, regulation is crucial, 
and it remains resolutely local or national. In the next section, I outline 
two approaches to regulation that are linked to the competing models of 
global water welfarism. Transactional regulation is coherent with the 
managed liberalisation model and political regulation with the 
participatory democracy model. 
 
A. POLITICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL REGULATION: THE DYSTOPIC 
SIDE OF ‘IDEAL TYPES’ 
The changes in the policy environment for urban water service delivery 
alluded to above are often presented as part of a larger process of 
embedding neoliberal policies in transnational settings (Goldman 2006; 
Conca 2006). Recent discussions of the ‘neoliberal shift’ (Peck and Tickell 
2002) emphasise that while earlier phases may have focused on ‘rolling 
back’ the state, contemporary policy approaches are more inclined to 
stress ‘rolling out’ the state, in variously creative ways. Regulating for 
access to water is an example of this creative turn. Regulatory 
frameworks, institutionalised at national or local levels rather than global, 
are an increasingly important aspect of the overall structure, often but not 
always centred around independent regulatory agencies. As will be 
explored in detail in Part III, the specific empirical trajectories of 
regulatory dynamics in different national sites vary considerably. To frame 
this discussion, it is helpful to specify two ‘ideal type’ images of 
regulation, while also appreciating their dystopic mirror images. These 
two images are of a political conception of regulation on the one hand and 
– perhaps more familiar – a transactional image on the other hand. It is 
important not to assume that the two necessarily fall on opposite sides of 
the political conflicts typical of access to water. Although the emphasis on 
regulation which has emerged in global water policy has taken root in a 
broadly neoliberal context, that context has significant non-market social 
aspirations. These lead to an emphasis not only on the provision of stable 
property rights for investors but also on complementary subsidy schemes 
and extensive ‘stakeholder’ participation. Moreover, ‘political’ regulation 
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may not necessarily benefit the poor through redistribution but may 
instead cement the position of local elites.  
 
A political conception of regulation draws from the French school of 
‘regulationist theory’ which has neo-Marxist roots, but is also compatible 
with a range of essentially Keynesian social welfare accounts of citizen-
state relations (Klerck 1996). Here, different modes of regulation, one 
mode of which may be law, are envisioned as tools for balancing and 
ensuring a ‘relatively harmonious relationship’ between production, 
consumption and exchange in the accumulation process. Regulation in this 
view is importantly mediated by “historically and spatially specific 
institutional forms and norms of behaviour” (Klerck 1996: 111), making 
the contingencies of specific local contexts and the quality of social 
relations between producers and consumers highly salient to any analysis. 
In particular, the regulationist school pays specific attention to “the impact 
of non-commodity forms of social relations which may assist in balancing 
consumption and production cycles (Klerck 1996: 111).  
 
Transactional regulation is perhaps more familiar, in content if not in 
name. Embedded in Weberian notions of calculability, it involves the state 
moving away from earlier welfare economics notions of pre-emptively 
correcting market failures that might harm vulnerable consumers. The 
state focuses instead on a more spartan role of facilitating transactional 
frameworks. Inside these transactional frameworks, those who implement 
delivery can and do address social issues, but within the purview of 
managerial discretion rather than as the implementation of a formal, even 
legal, obligation. The ‘transaction’ is the relationship between government 
and private provider, not between vulnerable consumers and a provider 
(public or private). Thus the quality of social relations between producers 
and consumers is not a direct concern for politics or law in this approach, 
but becomes part of market or commodity relations. Politics and law focus 
on the attempt to produce what one commentator vividly called 
‘bureaucrats with an entrepreneurial kick’!  
 
The difference between political and transactional regulation is partly a 
difference of ideology and substantive belief, focused on whether 
allocating resources should be tied to price or to political power. It is also 
a different approach to the quality of rules that structure the allocation of 
resources. In transactional regulation, stability is paramount and thus these 
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rules should be ‘time-consistent’; in political regulation, rules structuring 
the allocation of resources are more fluid and responsive to the changing 
social contexts of different consumer groups. It is fair to say that on the 
whole, transnational actors such as multinational companies or 
international financial institutions promote a transactional model while 
national governments prefer a political model. But as we shall see in Part 
Two, the full story is more complex, centring on different coalitions whose 
members include both national and international actors.  
  
In order to better frame the empirical complexity addressed in Part Two, it 
is helpful to insist upon the dystopian potential of each ideal type. To 
acknowledge that both political and transactional regulation can take 
pathological forms is to recognise, in a somewhat stylised way, the plural 
standpoints that necessarily characterise any collectivity. The following 
pictorial representation, which is drawn from a World Bank paper on 
regulation in Latin American water services (Foster 2005) shows, I would 
argue, a dystopic version of political regulation that is ‘cured’ by an ‘ideal 
type’ of transactional regulation. The ‘reformed’ model of regulation (an 
ideal type transactional view in my argument) seeks to eliminate ‘dole 
handouts and partisan loans’. The vision is one of purifying clientilism: 
politicians become policymakers giving strategic guidance; the creation of 
a regulatory agency replaces political favours with a focus on technical 
decisions about quality and price, introduces competition, and improves 
cost-recovery and labour efficiency; as a consequence, the unconnected 
are drawn into the circle of connection. 
 
Figure 3 ‘Clientilist’ model of water provision 
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Figure 4 ‘Reformed’ model of water provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vivien Foster, ‘Ten Years of Water Service Reform in Latin America: Towards 
an Anglo-French Model’ (2005:8) 
 
The trouble is, of course, that one person’s ‘dole handouts and partisan 
loans’ may be another person’s legitimate redistributive politics. Similarly, 
one person’s view that price and quality regulation applies independent 
expertise to issues formerly subject to arbitrary political discretion, may be 
mirrored by others’ opinion that this technocracy simply masks an 
inversely malign politics of regulatory capture. There are, in other words, 
‘missing’ politics in the reformed model that could equally be 
characterised either as features of political regulation’s ideal type, or as 
dystopic features of transactional regulation:  
 
Figure 5: 
The missing politics in the ‘reformed’ model
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Part III will explore the ways in which these ‘missing politics’ shape the 
regulatory dynamics that emerged in Chile, Argentina and Bolivia around 
the delivery of water services. While they can be portrayed as indications 
of a clash between incompatible models of global governance, more 
interesting and challenging questions emerge from looking at regulatory 
implementation in some detail. These questions raise the possibility that 
transnational transformations of developing states vis-à-vis their approach 
to water services delivery may catalyse an integration of constructive 
conflict into regulatory relationships. This would involve integrating 
professional expertise with modulated political input and feedback in such 
a way that over time, a regulatory culture that blends politics and expertise 
is institutionalised. Such a vision builds bridges between regulatory and 
citizen space (Morgan 2006a), while still acknowledging the political 
character of regulation (Dubash 2005; Minogue 2007).  Ultimately I argue 
that such bridges depend more crucially on local and national institutions, 
particularly of dispute resolution, than on transnational ones, but that 
productive reform can be catalysed by the transnational dimensions of 
regulatory change over time.  
 
III. COMPARATIVE REGULATORY DYNAMICS AND 
THE REVERBERATIONS OF ‘MISSING POLITICS’ 
 
Part III explores the regulatory dynamics that emerged in relation to the 
delivery of water services in urban contexts in three Latin American case 
studies in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s.5 
All three countries also experienced extensive foreign investment from the 
world’s largest water multinationals during the 1990s. Of the four largest 
water services firms active in the transnational water services market, 
                                                 
5 The empirical work reported in this section is drawn from a larger project in which six 
qualitative comparative case studies of (in most cases) specific disputes were carried out 
in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, France, New Zealand and South Africa, as well as 
interviews with international actors, and observations over two years of multi-stakeholder 
fora and trade and investment negotiations. The project aimed to explore the relationship 
between the local, national and transnational aspects of regulatory governance and grass-
roots advocacy in relation to urban water services policy. I am grateful to the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council for funding the research under the title ‘The 
Commodification of Water, Social Protest and Cosmopolitan Citizenship’: RES-143-25-
0031. 
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three are headquartered in France (Ondeo, Veolia and Saur) and one in the 
UK (Thames Water). The two largest, Ondeo and Veolia may be more 
commonly known as Suez and Vivendi.6 Suez, Vivendi and Thames all 
invested significantly in Chile, Bolivia and Argentina during the 1990s.7 
The fieldwork on which the research is based was structured around major 
disputes involving transnational water companies, using Chile as a control 
case since it lacked a single major dispute. All three countries established 
regulatory agencies: Argentina at provincial level and Bolivia and Chile at 
central government level. In Bolivia and Argentina, the disputes studied 
ended with the transnational investor terminating the concession and 
lodging a dispute in an international arbitration forum.  
 
The three countries share a formal similarity in their common adoption of 
semi-independent regulatory agencies in the water sector. However, this 
adoption occurred under very different contextual conditions: Bolivia was 
experiencing developments that led eventually to a social and political 
revolution of sorts with the election of Evo Morales as president; 
Argentina experienced a serious economic crisis in 2000; and Chile has 
remained a stable, depoliticized, investment-friendly context during the 
period studied. Their shared experience of transnational investment in 
cross-border markets for the delivery of water services generated a 
common pressure for transactional regulation, at least partially satisfied at 
the formal level by the existence of agencies in each country. But the 
detail of implementation indicates significant national variation in 
outcome, as the bulk of this section will explore. 
 
Before turning to the detailed case studies, it is worth noting that the 
regulatory structures for water service provision in the UK and France, the 
                                                 
6 The two largest by some margin are Ondeo (previously Suez and before that Lyonnaise 
des Eaux) which serves 110 million people in more than 100 countries, and Veolia 
(previously Vivendi Environnement and before that Compagnie Generale des Eaux) 
which serves 96.5 million people in 90 countries: see Gleick et al., The New Economy of 
Water (2002) at 24-25. Thames Water serves 22 million people: see D.Yaron, The Final 
Frontier (2000).  
7 Suez bought the regional water company providing water to Santiago, Chile and secured 
longterm concessions in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Cordoba, Argentina and La Paz, 
Bolivia. Thames bought initially one and eventually three regional water companies in 
the south of Chile. Vivendi had a stake in the Buenos Aires concession and also secured a 
longterm concession in the province of Tucuman, Argentina. The companies have now 
disinvested in all but  
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home states of investor companies, usefully illustrate the contingency of 
transactional and political models of regulation. The UK has arguably 
established one of the clearest instances of transactional regulation in 
water services anywhere in the world, with its fully privatised water 
industry regulated by an independent, highly technocratic regulatory 
agency Ofwat. France, by marked contrast, has self-consciously chosen 
not to establish such an agency, rejecting this option in a high-profile 
legislative debate as recently as 1999.8 Rather, France has achieved public 
service goals in water service delivery not by state provision9 but by 
political regulation,10 focused initially on substantive but increasingly on 
procedural aspects of long-term contracting-out for private sector 
provision.  
 
Such variation in the home investor country approaches is replicated even 
within countries. For while France has preserved political regulation 
internally for the provision of water services, its companies seek 
transactional regulation externally for the governance of their transnational 
investments. During the 1990s the transnational investment portfolios of 
French water companies increased significantly. Over the same period, 
France has been actively involved in trying to secure progress in 
transnational regulatory structures for water services. French companies 
and organisations were founding members of a voluntary self-regulatory 
regime through the International Standards Organisation (Morgan 2006c), 
and have lobbied vigorously to include water services in the GATS 
treaties. French companies also chose Latin America as their primary 
                                                 
8 See the 1999 report of the High Council on Public Services, Quelle régulation pour l'eau 
et les services publics FRANCE. Haut conseil du secteur public, Paris 1999. 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/004000299/ext.shtml. The 
proposal was highly politically sensitive and was abandoned in favour of a toothless 
‘water observatory’ with little funding or powers: interview with M. Sironneau and M. 
Riveau, Department of the Environment, September 2004. 
9 Interestingly, even though France is often seen as the exemplar of the European ‘social 
model’ with more enthusiasm than most for an etatist vision of ‘le service public’, in the 
specific domain of water services the role of the French state has been regulatory since 
the late 19th century 
10 Until 1982, this centred on model contracts for leases and concessions whose terms 
were centrally controlled, especially in relation to prices. The decentralisation reforms of 
the 1980s in France led to a period of fairly unregulated contractual amendments, but the 
1990s saw a return of political regulation, focused now on procedural issues such as 
transparency of tendering. 
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destination for pursuing longterm water concessions in the 1990s, a setting 
where more than perhaps anywhere else in the developing world, the 
spread of independent regulatory agencies had taken root (Jordana and 
Levi-Faur 2005). Finally, French water companies have extensively used 
the dispute resolution facilities provided by venues such as the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
the World Bank (Morgan 2006c). It is the combination of the two 
strategies (political regulation at home and transactional regulation 
abroad) that coalesces in the vision of ‘managed liberalisation’ mentioned 
earlier as one of the competing models in global water governance.  
 
As we shall see in the rest of Part III , a competing model is emerging 
from the regulatory dynamics in host states of transnational investment, an 
important counter to assumptions too often made that globalisation 
involves the subjection of developing countries to ‘external’ pressures to 
which they ‘respond’. The most important source of this competing model, 
based on participatory visions of democracy, are the events that unfolded 
in Bolivia. 
A. WATER AND REGULATION IN BOLIVIA 
 
Although Suez had a major contract in Bolivia’s capital, La Paz, the 
detailed dispute that was the subject of field research in the larger project 
underpinning this article was an earlier concession in Cochabamba held by 
a joint venture between Bechtel and International Water. The Cochabamba 
dispute has become an iconic reference point (in either positive or negative 
terms depending on one’s perspective) in international regulatory and 
political dynamics around struggles over access to water. At the same 
time, the presence of ‘repeat players’ such as Suez in La Paz importantly 
shaped the Bolivian government’s response to conflict over water service 
delivery in Cochabamba.  
 
In 1997, Bolivia decided to involve the international private sector in 
water provision in Cochabamba, in part motivated by a very ambitious 
vision of water resource development for this normally very arid region, 
involving not only the operation of urban water services but also the 
construction of a major dam (the Miscuni Dam). Although there was 
certainly pressure from the Inter-American Development Bank to contract 
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out this work to the private sector, there was also an undoubted enthusiasm 
on the part of local political elites for securing the financial backing of a 
large multinational for this project. As a result of this local-international 
coalition, the key political dynamics likely to disrupt the process were 
those at municipal level. This fitted badly with the timing and placement 
of the relevant regulatory agency. Bolivia had established a detailed 
legislative structure for utilities as a whole (gas, electricity, 
telecommunications and water) in 1994, with a ‘super-regulator’ 
(SIRESE) overseeing a range of sectoral regulators.11 This operated at 
central government level with little consultation with municipal 
governments. The government originally planned to establish separate 
regulators for water resources and for water services but the former ran 
into sufficient political opposition that by 1997, only detailed regulations 
for bringing into being a regulatory agency for water services had 
emerged.  
 
More problematically, the framework of legal duties for the water services 
regulator, the Superintendent of Basic Sanitation (SISAB), was 
substantially amended just one month after Cochabamba’s water services 
were concessioned to Bechtel in September 1999. The 1999 Ley de 
Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario (Law 2029), despite 
its title focusing on the provision of water and waste services, in fact 
empowered SISAB to regulate water resources more generally 
(agricultural, irrigation, industrial, mining, etc.) at least until a specific 
body was created for this purpose.12 This gave SISAB highly controversial 
powers at the precise moment when its regulatory task expanded 
enormously with the entry of the international private sector into the 
Bolivian water services market.  
 
An overall evaluation of SISAB’s role in the Bolivian case study suggests 
that despite it possessing some formal technical capacity, it was politically 
marginalised. It was structured to emulate an idea of transactional 
                                                 
11 1994 Ley No. 1600, October 28, 1994 framework of all regulators (Sistema de 
Regulacion Sectorial - SIRESE).  
12 Specifically, the very last provision of law 2029 (dubbed a transitory article)  says that 
the concessions and authorizations for the usage of hydrological resources as well as their 
revocation will be granted by a regulator to be created under the Framework Regulatory 
System of Renewable Natural Resources (SIRENARE). It adds, however, that this 
regulator is created such functions will be performed by SISAB. 
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regulation but embedded in a broader context that supported political 
regulation at best, and from some quarters a far more populist and 
participatory politically driven vision of local development. It was located 
at central government level although water services had been delivered by 
public municipal-level entities. Although it was relatively independent 
from immediate political influence of any crude kind, and its employees 
did possess basic technical expertise, it had an inadequate legal structure 
and only 31 staff. Its birth and culture was also heavily shaped by 
international expertise and support, and continues to be heavily dependent 
on this for operating at all: international financial institutions staffed the 
initial unit that drafted the SIRESE framework and continues to support 
SISAB extensively with consultancies or even basic staff support.13 The 
InterAmerican Development Bank in 2002 actually become a member of 
ANESAPA, the Bolivian professional association of water companies, 
illustrating the deep interpenetration of the national and international 
sector in the Bolivian context.14 
 
SISAB’s regulatory role in supervising international contracts took place 
in the shadow of Bolivia’s commitment to systems of international 
arbitration for dispute resolution through various bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). Here in particular, the influence of international politics 
has been very powerful. For example, shortly after signing the concession, 
Bechtel relocated its corporate headquarters to the Netherlands, making it 
possible for Bechtel to take advantage of the protection afforded by the 
BIT between the Netherlands and Bolivia (there was no equivalent US-
Bolivia BIT). Evidence from Argentina discussed below suggests that 
ICSIT-based dispute resolution undermines a political response to 
regulatory conflict, and may shore up a transactional response. However, 
in Bolivia, SISAB’s position was not shored up, raising the question of 
why the regulator was so politically marginalized despite its technical 
capacity and strong international support?  
 
                                                 
13 Interview with Silvia Arzabe, Planning Support Officer for SISAB, September 2004. 
14 Semapa: a un ano de la institucionalizacion, Semapa annual report 2002-3. ANESAPA 
began as a public sector trade organization in 1982, expanded to allow private and 
cooperative companies as members in 1997, and in 2002, expanded to include “national 
and international institutions, NGOs or natural persons with legal relations with the water 
sector”: p.67. 
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The answer lies in the restricted ambit of what social groups perceived as 
SISAB’s legitimate jurisdiction. The key focus of broad regulatory 
dynamics in the Bolivian case was the legislative framework for water 
resources broadly speaking: provisions affecting irrigation, mining and so 
on. This was far broader than the infrastructural issues which the SISAB 
regulatory framework focused on, and even though the government 
formally gave broader duties to SISAB in the 1999 amendments, the lack 
of perceived legitimacy for this action stymied progress in the key action 
sites. These were popular politics and mass mobilization, together with 
legislative negotiations to create a new framework for governing water 
resources more generally. SISAB had little chance of emerging as an 
important player in this context, appearing as an agency bravely trying to 
join a field of professional expertise with which few of the politically 
salient local players were familiar, and manipulating the technical 
minutiae of a regulatory politics which did not resonate or have any 
history of engagement with local political dynamics.  
 
Two examples suffice to illustrate this tension. The first occurred during 
the dispute: in December 1999, SISAB held a public hearing on tariffs. 
They required those who attended to register and to bring identification 
and consequently only 14 people pre-registered. In the event, it was 
suspended when SISAB realized it was likely to catalyse a large social 
mobilization: the latter was much more salient in shaping the policy 
trajectory on tariffs than SISAB’s attempts at transparency. The second 
example comes from the period after the Cochabamba municipal water 
company was remunicipalised: since around 2002, SISAB has valiantly 
tried (with World Bank funding) to install a consumer education 
programme, focused on training neighbourhood board leaders, social 
groups, guilds, mothers associations, and church groups in matters of 
‘regulation, rights, obligations, complaints, and water care’. However, at 
the same time as this was occurring, the groups most capable of derailing 
the larger policy agenda were involved in extensive deliberative, 
participatory drafting of the new water resources legislative framework,15 
                                                 
15 This evolved from a civil society-based organization, Comité de Gestión Integral del 
Agua en Bolivia (CGIAB) in 1998, to an Interinstitutional Water Council (CONIAG) 
collaboratively which had representatives from agriculture, sustainable development, 
economics, housing and basic services from the government, as well as 5 civil society 
representatives from peasants, irrigators, indigenous people, private sector and academia. 
By 2004 CONIAG had drafted and passed Law 2878 for the support of irrigators. 
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and in instantiating ‘social control’ of the municipal company (Terhorst 
2003). In their view this extensive consumer outreach programme only 
reached issues at the margins of what mattered most to people, at a point 
in time that was too late for them to shape the more structural decisions 
that would determine the allocation of resources and power.16 Co-
management, not consultation, was the politically salient issue, and was 
sidestepped by the design of SISAB’s consumer awareness programme.  
 
In short, the regulatory agency was focused on a technocratic approach to 
the ‘minor water cycle’ while the most politically salient players placed 
the ‘major water cycle’ at the centre of a highly politicized and expressive 
politics of struggle. The implicit social imaginary driving the politics of 
the Bolivian case – a vision of politically driven, locally rooted, holistic 
development – had little synergy with the independent regulatory agency 
modelled on the ‘best practice’ recommendations of international financial 
institutions.  Instead, this social imaginary was at the root of a 
reinvigorated vision of participatory public management: a vision that 
aspires to replace the managed liberalization of global water welfarism. 
This has to some extent taken place in water. For example, after the 
election of Evo Morales, whose success was deeply rooted in struggles 
over access to natural resources, the international arbitration action arising 
from the Cochabamba dispute was eventually settled for the symbolic sum 
of 2 Bolivian pesos. And more recently, Bolivia very publicly withdrew 
from the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). We shall see in the Argentinian case study a different 
kind of compromise which favours the transactional regulation model to a 
greater degree. But what is emerging in Bolivia is not purely nationalist, 
but is embedded in moves on the international stage since Evo Morales 
became President,17 some in alliance with Cuba and Venezuela,18 that are 
arguably coalescing into a broader agenda that some call a Bolivarian 
Revolution’ (Gott and Bartoli 2005). This illustrates that the ‘politics of 
necessity’ have their sources as much in the developing world as in the 
                                                 
16 Crespo Carlos Crespo Flores, Oxford Brookes University, “Superintendencias: Nuevos 
Superpoderes (Democracia y Regulación en Bolivia)”, paper on file with author. 
17 Eg the withdrawal from the ISCID Convention, the appointment of one of the major El 
Alto water activists in La Paz to the post of Water Minister. 
18 Eg the dissenting Ministerial Declaration at the 4th World Water Forum in Mexico in 
2006, drafted by Bolivia and endorsed by Cuba and Venezuela. 
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industrialised world, even when the relations between them are as sharply 
polarised as the Bolivian case study indicates. 
 
B. WATER AND REGULATION IN CHILE 
 
Chile’s regulatory institutions represent something much closer to the 
‘ideal’ transactional vision supported by international financial institutions 
and a strong epistemic community. A number of features make Chile’s 
politics of water privatization unique. First, access to water in Chile is far 
more widespread than other developing countries. In 1930, the Chilean 
central government made the provision of water and sewage services 
(WSS) a developmental priority, and unusually high coverage has 
subsisted especially since the 1970s.19 Secondly, the provision of water 
services is unusually centralised – even a restructuring along regional lines 
in the 1970s followed technocratic lines, creating 12 centrally controlled 
regional public companies rather than decentralising any authority to more 
local political levels of government. In the 1980s, the decentralization 
sweeping the rest of Latin America was rejected in Chile, influenced by 
the ‘Chicago boys’: economic technocrats holding powerful positions in 
government, many of whom were educated at the University of Chicago 
economics department. They argued that there was insufficient 
professional capacity at local government levels, and that the private 
sector would provide more reliable expertise as well as efficiency gains. 
Thirdly, Chile is unusually urban – only 10% of the population lives in 
rural areas. And finally, there is a relatively low level of civil society 
activism, particularly around issues of socio-economic policy.20  
 
Thus rather than an urgent need for investment for basic access to water, 
the catalyst for the entry of the international private sector into Chile’s 
WSS sector was two-fold in the 1980s: ideological neo-liberalism, and the 
need to raise private finance to build waste treatment plants. Some argue 
                                                 
19 Coverage is 99.7% and 24 hours a day and sewage is 94%: Alexander Chechilnitzky, 
“AIDIS: 55 anos de fructifera labor”, La Revista de Aidis-Chile, September 2003. 
20 The causes of this are not clear – many interviewees attributed it to Chilean culture, but 
the lingering effects of Pinochet’s dictatorship may be just as material: see Houtzager and 
Kurtz 2000 for an argument about the lingering effects of institutional and structural 
changes introduced by Pinochet on rural grass-roots mobilization. See also Foweraker 
2001. 
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that the US-Chile free trade agreement created legal pressures to meet 
international standards in wastewater treatment in order to facilitate fruit 
exports – but it is not entirely clear if this was a post hoc justification for 
an otherwise ideological decision to involve the private sector. It does 
appear, however, that economic export-oriented goals were an important 
part of the motivation, and the percentage of wastewater that is now 
treated has almost doubled between 1998 and 2005.21 
 
Chile’s water services have undergone three main reforms in the structure 
of provision: corporatisation 1989-1998 (associated with efficiency gains), 
a brief period of privatisation 1998-2001 (associated with raising capital to 
build waste treatment plants) and concessioning 2001-present (associated 
with a political backlash against privatization). The public water 
companies were restructured along ‘corporatised’ lines in 1989 just before 
democracy returned to Chile,22 and Aylwin’s centre-left government left 
this in place. Almost a decade later, after a stormy debate in 1998 under 
the centre-left government of Eduardo Frei, legislation to allow 
privatization was passed, albeit with a ceiling on ownership.23 This ceiling 
was quietly removed a few months later in a little-noticed tax bill.24 
Between 1998 and 2000, five of the 13 regional companies were 
privatised.25 The remaining eight were offered out to long-term 
concessions rather than outright privatisation.26 Few seem to think that the 
difference between outright asset sales and long-term concession has any 
powerful political or even practical implications. Indeed, despite the shift 
away from privatisation towards the concession system, another little-
noticed tax bill in 2003 allowed four of the five companies originally 
                                                 
21 Treated wastewater levels were 42% in 2003 but were on target to reach 81% by the 
end of 2005: Alexander Chechilnitzky, “AIDIS: 55 anos de fructifera labor”, La Revista 
de Aidis-Chile, September 2003. 
22 The state industry development arm CORFO was relieved of service delivery 
obligations in water. 13 regional joint-stock companies were created: Ley 18.777 of 17 
January 1989 
23 General Law for Sanitation Services (Law 19,549, 1995 bill) of February 5 1998.  
24 Article 5 of Ley 19,888 of 14 July 1998 (a general tax law) abolished any ceiling on the 
sale of shares in water companies. 
25 Emos (Santiago - Suez), Esval (Valparaiso, Region V - Anglian), Essbio (Concepion, 
Region VIII - Thames), Essel (Region VI - Thames) and Essal (Region VIII – Iberdrola). 
26 An internal review by the then President Richard Lagos in the late 1990s, then Minister 
of Public Works (and later to be President in 2001) underpinned this policy shift.  
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privatised in the late 1990s to be sold entirely.27 This narrative 
encapsulates Chilean regulatory dynamics in the water sector: an odd mix 
of polarised public political debate that fails to alter the direction of the 
policy trajectory, together with major decisions made in the interstices of 
technical and obscure legislation.  
 
Water services in Chile are regulated by SISS (the Superintendency of 
Sanitation Services).28 SISS is a regulatory agency that replaced a 
government department in 1990 when corporatisation took place. 
Consistent with transactional models of regulation, the key relationships 
were those between the regulator and the regional companies, rather than 
those with consumers. During the 1990s, these relationships (between 
SISS and the regional companies) were ones of negotiation and fairly 
cordial bargaining. The shift to privatisation in 1998 inaugurated a more 
adversarial relationship between operators and regulator. In the wake of 
the rapid privatisation of 5 of the 13 companies, between 2000 and 2001 
fines imposed by SISS increased by 69%.29. An analysis of SISS data on 
adjudicatory decisions by the regulator together with judicial appeals 
(1995-2005: see Figure 1) shows that the privatised companies dominate 
the statistics of above-average fines levied, the highest rates of large fines, 
and the highest appeal rates against fines.30 The actions were also almost 
without exception initiated by the regulator or the company rather than 
consumers, and focused mainly on defining the limits of property rights as 
between regulator and operator – i.e. typical of transactional regulatory 
politics. Moreover, although SISS usually prevailed upon appeal, and 
although at least some of these instances should have indirectly benefited 
                                                 
27 A bill to "establish the funding needed to ensure the priority social objectives of the 
government":Ley 19888 of August 2003, Article 5. Emos, the Santiago company and the 
most politically sensitive, was not included. 
28 Chile's water resources are regulated by the general water department (DGA), a unit of 
the Ministry of Public Works which oversees a complex system of tradeable water rights 
established in 1981 (a system beyond the scope of this research). 
29 Morrison Foerseter, Quarterly Report on Water Industry Developments in Latin America – 
March 2002. 2001 fines were 33 in number totalling US$1.07 million 
30 One interesting exception to the general pattern is Essbio, the Thames-owned company 
which attracted the highest fines but did not feature in the high appeal statistics. This can 
be explained  by the fact that Essbio attracted more political controversy than any other 
water company in Chile and may have considered the political costs of appealing greater 
than the likelihood of success. 
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consumers, the Chilean water sector lacks any legal device for 
indemnifying consumers.  
 
Figure 4: Analysis of cases brought to Chilean water regulator SISS 
1995-2005 
Company No of fines % of total Appealed or not 
% 
appealed 
Fines 
= or > 
300 
UTM 
Average 
fine  
Aguas Andinas 3 2% 3 100% 0 200  
Essar 5 3% 0 0% 0 9  
Esmag 2 1% 0 0% 0 55.5  
Essan 3 2% 0 0% 0 85.67  
Essel 23 16% 2 9% 10 243.43  
Essam 10 7% 1 10% 1 259.8 
Essat 12 8% 2 17% 2 260.33 
Essbio 23 16% 5 22% 8 488.91 
Essco 7 5% 2 29% 2 137.14  
Emmssa 3 2% 1 33% 0 48.67  
Essal 13 9% 6 46% 3 217.15  
Emssat 6 4% 3 50% 0 48.33  
Emos 21 15% 11 52% 3 137.14  
Esval 13 9% 8 62% 5 446.85 
        
Total 144 100% 31% 33.10% 23.61% 202.92  
        
 
Average fine  202.92       
 
Above average 
fines Essbio, Esval, Essat, Essam, Essel, Emmssa (descending order)  
Average appeal 
rate 31%   (descending order)  
Those with 
highest appeal 
rates Esval, Emos, Essal 
(descending order,  
all above 1000 UTM) 
Highest rate of 
big fines Essbio, Essel, Esval, Essal, Essat, Emos, Essam (descending order)  
Highest fines per 
se  Essbio, Esval, Essam, Essat     
Big fines as % of 
total fines Essbio+Esval+Essam+Essat=10968/total fines 36487=30.06% 
 
Source: compiled from analysis of SISS records 
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Regulatory politics in Chilean water services are characteristic of broader 
macro-characteristics of Chile’s economy, which is heavily structured 
along market lines yet markedly unfriendly to consumers:31 a kind of 
openly clientilistic version of neoliberal reforms. Chilean water regulation 
exemplifies a specific ideal of transactional regulation in that the 
regulatory agency was established 9 years before full privatisation as a 
way of disciplining the (then) newly corporatised water company 
companies. The key issues that attract regulatory energy are tariff-setting, 
accounting processes for investment obligations, procurement processes, 
and mergers. Social issues are kept firmly separate from the regulatory 
agency, mainly consisting of a complex subsidy scheme administered by 
the municipalities.  
 
A brief description of how tariffs are set is an emblematic instance of the 
texture of Chilean regulatory politics in water. The tariff system is based 
on hypothetical models of a perfectly efficient company, rather than on 
trying to cost in actually existing inefficiencies. Both the regulator and the 
company produce estimates based on their own models, using complex 
formulae that are laid down by the legislative framework, and public terms 
of reference for the models. 15 days of negotiation follow the production 
of estimates, and if no consensus can be reached, an expert panel of 3 
makes the final decision.32  
 
Interestingly, international arbitration is not a powerful feature of the 
regulatory space in Chilean water politics. One interpretation of this is that 
international investors respect the combination of the formal independence 
and substantive expertise of the regulator as sufficient to provide the 
political stability they need and seek. But an equally plausible reason for 
this comfort could be the political support enjoyed by international 
investors. The international private sector directly provides a majority of 
Chile’s citizens with water services. The policy environment is sensitive to 
                                                 
31 In 2005 the World Economic Forum gave Chile first place for macroeconomic 
handling in a global survey, but only 53rd place for consumer responsiveness: Eduardo 
Engel, ‘Consumidores: tres tareas pendientes’, La Tercera, 20 noviembre 2005.  
32 One member is nominated by the relevant company, one by the regulator SISS and the 
third agreed upon by both. Often the third member (typically a PhD qualified economist) 
effectively decides the issue. The expert panel decisions have never been judicially 
reviewed, though heated technical debates regarding the parameters of the models have 
persisted and been clarified over time by legislative revision. 
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perceptions of ‘investment climate’ held by these investors, and this 
undoubtedly shapes the regulatory dynamics.33 Moreover, the separation 
between economic and social issues mentioned above in the domestic 
context is mirrored in relation to transnational links.  While dispute 
settlement does not strongly shape the Chilean regulatory environment in 
the water sector, Chile has extensive links to regional and global 
associations that set standards, such as AIDIS (InterAmerican Association 
of Engineers). Santiago also hosts the Latin American branches of both the 
UN Economic and Social Commission and of Consumers International, 
embedding it in international networks of actors who develop the social 
and consumer dimensions of water policy.  
 
Overall, the day-to-day regulatory dynamics are dominated by a legalised 
power struggle between major interests, irritated at the margins by party-
political dynamics which are often limited in their effectiveness due to the 
strong centralisation of executive power in Chilean constitutional 
structure. This creates less of a powerful basis for constructive conflict in 
regulatory politics in Chile than might initially seem to be the case. 
Routinised technocracy coexists with, but is relatively unresponsive to, a 
politicised debate portrayed in black-and-white terms. In this, there is little 
or no integration of professional expertise with modulated political input 
and feedback, and thus only very weak institutionalization of a regulatory 
culture that blends politics and expertise.  
 
Arguably, an important ‘missing link’ is the absence of space for the 
routinised incorporation of ‘everyday citizen’ demands. In Bolivia, these 
were expressed through mass mobilisation and direct action. At best what 
exists in Chile is a highly individualised form of action within consumer 
law. In Argentina, as we shall see, lower levels of direct action coexist 
with administrative law-type procedures for vindicating the public interest. 
But in Chile there is a marked absence of such devices.34 Even though 
                                                 
33 Some interviewees made off-the-record comments regarding the subtle but powerful 
(investor-friendly) influence of the Ministry of Economics over SISS. 
34 In 2004, consumer protection legislation was finally amended after a 6 year battle, to 
include a mild form of class action and some incentives to encourage collective consumer 
associations. However even this reform (which itself is much criticised: Eduardo Engel, 
‘Consumidores: tres tareas pendientes’, La Tercera, 20 noviembre 2005, noting that only 
3 collective actions were lodged in the first year since the law was passed) does not 
include public services within its remit.  
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interviewees evoke an implicit social imaginary of a legalistic conception 
of the public interest underpinning regulatory dynamics, there is little 
institutional support for actually making this a reality. The legal device of 
recurso de proteccion (effectively the ability to obtain an injunction) does 
not facilitate collective consumer action: it is used mainly by the 
companies against the regulator (not least because it must be filed within 
15 days of any harm occurring). In addition, it creates no stare decisis and 
relies on a dogmatic, slow and untransparent judicial process. There are no 
administrative courts where abusive and illegal action can be challenged 
by individuals. The most powerful oversight institution is the Controloria 
which is an auditor, and ensures the legality of executive decrees. The 
Controloria has facilitated an obsessive focus upon legality and 
administrative probity but in business-friendly ways rather than collective 
public interest. In short, the space for articulating claims of fairness, 
equity, or human rights is severely constricted.  
 
Of course, there are still ‘missing politics’ that drive the regulatory 
dynamics away from the transactional model. It is not that lay-offs, tariff 
rises, or undue contractor influence do not exist in Chile. Rather, they 
seem not to spark the same kind of political mobilisation as they do in, for 
example, Argentina. One interviewee from the Central Labour Union in 
Chile said – with some regret – that ‘in Argentina, when the lights go off, 
the people burn tires on the roadways and build barricades, while in Chile 
they simply go down to the supermarket and buy candles’.35 Direct action 
is remarkably muted, and public media coverage of water provision issues 
focuses overwhelmingly on making the country safe for foreign investors. 
There is certainly contestation. Some comes from individual legislators 
who take up the cause of constituency members.36 Citizen groups have 
also mobilised from time to time, albeit weakly. But the tight connections 
between local elites and the mainstream transactional consensus on water 
service provision means that managed liberalisation and transactional 
regulation dominate the Chilean case.  
 
                                                 
35 Interview, Miguel Soto, Central Workers’ Union, January 2004. 
36 See motions filed by Chilean House of Representatives member Patricio Walker, of the 
Christian Democratic (DC), deputy Antonella Sciaraffia and senate candidate Fernando 
Flores: La Estrella de Iquique, reported. In Morrison and Foerster quarterly update. 
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C. WATER AND REGULATION IN ARGENTINA 
 
In the early 1990s, President Menem’s sweeping neoliberal reforms to the 
Argentine economy set the stage for the entry of the international private 
sector into the water services sector. At the provincial level, these reforms 
were enacted more as a result of pressure from the federal government 
than from any locally relevant political dynamics, and this haunted the 
regulatory dynamics from the start. In Tucumán province, the troubled 
provincial state water company DIPOS had been governed by 15 different 
Directors between 1981 (when it was first transferred to provincial control 
from the federal government) and 1996. In March 1994, soon after the 
Tucumán government passed a legislative framework for privatization in 
March 1994 and by May 1995 had awarded a 30 year concession contract 
to Vivendi.37 At the same time, there were attempts to transform DIPOS 
into a regulator entitled ERSACT (Ente Regulador del Servicio de Agua y 
Cloadas de Tucuman). These began in late 1994 and were formalised by 
November 1995, in the process downsizing the 1,800 employees of 
DIPOS to 900. The transformation was formal and superficial, arguably 
one in name only, as employees were given little additional training or 
preparation for this entirely new role of regulating rather than operating.38  
  
In this messy fashion, DIPOS became ERSACT, now ostensibly an 
independent regulator with the job of monitoring concessionaire providers 
of water. ERSACT suffered from  being a provincial regulator established 
more or less through central fiat, as well as having no time to embed its 
new role before the international private sector began operating in the 
province. The outcome was that the regulator lacked substantial expertise, 
and played a populist role in the regulatory dynamics – one that was at 
times politically salient, though certainly not in the ideal-typical image of 
transactional regulation. The most interesting moment of ERSACT’s 
political salience was when a leveraged coordination with the ombudsman 
                                                 
37 Formally speaking the contract was with Vivendi’s Argentine affiliate Aguas del 
Aconquija. The parent company was known as Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) at 
the time of entering into the concession and more recently as Veolia, though still more 
popularly recognized as Vivendi, which will be the name used here. Although Aguas del 
Aconquija has a separate legal personality, it is controlled in substance by Vivendi.  
38 Interview with Daniel Arancibia, former President of ERSACT and Director of DIPOS, 
June 2004. 
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occurred, as will be narrated below. While there were definite limits to the 
constructive nature of these regulatory politics, the episode certainly 
illustrates an interesting interaction of international, national and local 
pressures within one regulatory space, one which shows both the necessity 
of taking into account consumer group perspectives, and the significant 
limits on state responsiveness created by transnational pressures. 
 
The concession contract contained detailed provisions about the service 
that Vivendi would provide, the tariffs it would charge, and the 
investments it would make. After the agreement was entered into, disputes 
arose between Vivendi and Tucumán over various issues including the 
method for measuring water consumption, the level of tariffs to customers, 
the timing and percentage of any increase in tariffs, the remedy for non-
payment of tariffs, Vivendi’s right to pass-through to customers certain 
taxes, and the quality of the water delivered. The disputes took multiple 
forms at the domestic level but led ultimately to an arbitration claim 
lodged by Vivendi in the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).39  
 
The possibility of international arbitration under ICSID shaped the larger 
political context. The federal government undertook a diplomatic mission 
to resolve the dispute informally, sending former President Menem of 
Argentina to France to negotiate there, pressuring provincial officials in 
Tucumán both publicly in the press and privately,40 and helping prepare a 
new agreement between Vivendi and Tucumán Province with a Working 
Group of the Provincial Attorney-General, a union representative and the 
CEO of Vivendi.41 This created significant pressure on the local dispute 
resolution dynamics, however subtly. A key focus of the broader 
regulatory dynamics was legislation that the legislature was trying to pass 
that would have mandated ‘social tariffs’ in an attempt to temper the 
                                                 
39 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine 
Republic, Award,  ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (12 November 2000), 40 ILM 426, also 
available (with subseqent decisions on the same case) at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm#award15. The case was originally 
filed on February 19 1997, relying on a 1991 BIT between Argentina and France. 
40 The Minister of Economy at the time, Fernandez, even threatened a federal-provincial 
lawsuit for the damage caused to Argentina’s image in the eyes of foreign investors. 
41 Interview with Maria Pedicone de Valls, Provincial Attorney-General of Tucuman, 
August 2004. 
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effects of tariff rises under the concession. A mix of party political moves, 
popular action on the streets, and small claims lawsuits kept pushing 
forward this focus. But ultimately it clashed with the transnational 
dimensions, as illustrated by the following story of the effect of an uneven 
background distribution of power.  
 
In the summer of 1996, many thousands of users ceased paying their water 
bills in the wake of brown water and rising costs. The Tucumán 
Ombudsman advised consumers who did this to lodge an administrative 
dispute with the company alleging deficient rendering of services in 
respect of water quality and incorrectly calculated tariffs.42 Non-response 
to this dispute letter within 15 days bounced the dispute to the regulator, 
ERSACT, who issued two resolutions discounting consumers bills’ in two 
respects.43  Although only about 10% of payment boycotters filed the 
appropriate paperwork, this still amounted to some thousands of people. 
Vivendi did not challenge the decrees of the Ombudsman and regulator in 
local courts but continued to voice its disagreement even while invoicing 
customers in accordance with the decrees, and then immediately filing suit 
against the boycotters to recover the unpaid charges once they had 
rescinded the contract. Before the ICSID claim was filed, however, they 
preferred to continue with political negotiations.  
 
The Ombudsman took two unprecedented steps in response to Vivendi’s 
lawsuits against the boycotters, basing its strategy on the fact that the 
company was no longer the water provider by then. First, the Office tried 
to lodge a collective action lawsuit in the courts on behalf of the 
boycotters, but this was rejected in multiple consecutive fora by a series of 
different judges. Secondly, it offered individual legal assistance to 
consumers, having failed to secure such assistance from the local bar 
association.44 Now it is difficult to substantiate directly the shadow of the 
international power dynamics, not least because of the delicate political 
                                                 
42 This advice was supported by a series of resolutions issued by the Ombudsman’s 
Office (n° 66 and n° 67 of 1996) that highlight the details of why the invoicing was 
incorrect, drawing also on a public auditors’ report to the same effect (Tucuman Audit 
Office Report 015, on file with author). 
43 Resolution n° 212 and n° 213, discounting the bills first, by the amount of disputed 
taxes that Vivendi was passing through on the bill, and secondly by the amount paid for 
water during the periods that  turbid, chocolate-coloured water was provided. 
44 Interview with Bossio, Ombudsman, August 2004.. 
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nature of the conflict.45 But a somewhat extraordinary sequence of judicial 
evasions in response to the Ombudsman’s claim resulted: in essence, ‘they 
passed the ball from one to the other and nobody wanted to receive us’.46 
The local bar association was similarly reluctant to become involved, and 
there were vociferous – albeit disputed47 – claims that the World Bank 
inserted a condition around that time on a large health and education loan 
that required conflicts with public service concessions to be eliminated or 
resolved. ERSACT was marginalised by the provincial government who 
intervened in a receiver-like process, appointing an alternative auditor to 
oversee the concession on the grounds that the company felt persecuted by 
ERSACT.48 Overall, there was a distinct sense that World Bank and 
ICSID processes constrained the domestic substantive and procedural 
possibilities, even if the precise mechanisms of intervention were disputed 
or indirect.  
 
In terms of outcomes the legacy of this intersection of national and 
international developments was ambiguous. The Tucuman water services 
have been renationalised since 2004. Although the state company has 
struggled to improve water services, the forms of civil society involvement 
that were catalysed initially by private sector involvement have persisted 
into the renewed era of public service operation. Civil society continued to 
promote, after renationalisation, many legislative proposals, particularly 
relating to tariff structures, disconnection and the recovery of unpaid bills, 
                                                 
45 This sensitivity is illustrated by the fact that a lawsuit filed by the Provincial Attorney-
General against Vivendi for breach of contract was later withdrawn when a change of 
government occurred and has never been re-filed, despite the promises of three 
consecutive Attorney-Generals to do so (Interviews with Ombudsman Bossio; Maria 
Pedicone de Valls Provincial Attorney-General; Jose Domieu and Jorge Abdala, both 
representing consumers’ associations, August 2004). 
46 Interview with Maria Pedicone de Valls, Provincial Attorney-General of Tucuman, 
August 2004. The courts were willing to hear many individual claims against non-payers 
and issued sentences in relation to them, but the legislature intervened and passed a law 
suspending the enforcement of these sentences for six months. This law became another 
aspect of Vivendi’s claim in the ICSID process 
47 Interviewees gave conflicting reports but a 13 August 1998 report in the local 
newspaper La Gaceta quoted Governor Bussi as saying that US$55 million from the 
World Bank could not be disbursed until the federal government had taken over the 
concession, allowing Vivendi to leave.  
48 Interview with Daniel Arancibia, former President of ERSACT and Director of DIPOS, 
June 2004. 
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both before and after the return of water services into public hands. In the 
short term, effects on participation opportunities were disappointing. No 
right to public hearings was obtained (although a precedent for this existed 
in electricity), and a promised consumer representative on ERSACT’s 
Board of Directors never came to fruition.  
 
But substantive gains were made, including legislative prohibition of 
water cut-offs to those using less than the basic minimum, and a ‘dispute 
letter’ which boycotting consumers successfully used to stave off legal 
action by Vivendi for non-payment, even after the Ombudsman’s legal 
action stalled.49 And it is possible to argue that procedurally a kind of 
‘popcorn’ incrementalism resulted: cumulatively, the unintended effects 
did open up more space for responding to consumer concerns. In 
particular, after a series of consumer group mobilisations in relation to 
different water services contracts across Argentina, several involving 
coalitions with international NGOs, a procedural victory of considerable 
significance has emerged: the acceptance by ICSID tribunals of amicus 
curiae briefs from civil society organizations, even in the face of 
objections from parties.50  Interestingly, what we see in these two kinds of 
gains is an uneasy truce between political regulation at the local level, and 
a more transactional model at the interface with transnational actors in 
arbitration fora. For even though the ICSID process amendment is a 
victory for participation, it is a form of participation that still sidesteps 
democractically elected governments, and does nothing to expand their 
policy space. Taken in conjunction with the recent award of US$105 
million by ICSID to Vivendi for compensation in the dispute, the 
opportunity to lodge a brief in ICSID hearings is at risk of being a 
marginal amendment to the overriding dominance of transactional 
regulation and the liberalised management model of global water 
welfarism. 
 
 
                                                 
49 Interview with Jiminez Lascano, DUDAS consumers’ association, August 2004.  
50 Aguas Argentinas S.A., Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., Vivendi 
Universal S.A. c. República Argentina. Caso Nº ARB/03/19. See also more recently a 
similar order in a case involving the British water company Biwater in Tanzania: Biwater 
v Tanzania, Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No.5. 
  
32                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 07 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The case studies summarised in this article show a limited degree of 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) in the 
organisational choices of three Latin American states in the 1990s, each of 
whom formally established semi-independent regulatory agencies to 
monitor the delivery of water services. These emerged in a context shaped 
by the influence of conditional lending by international financial 
institutions and of a strong mainstream consensus on the desirability of 
transactional regulation. This consensus is embedded in a technocratic 
epistemic community whose members include national elites: in other 
words, it is national-international coalitions that support a liberalised 
management model for global water governance. No story of a 
‘transnational’ transformation of the state is ever purely a story of external 
moulding.  
 
Having said this, the apparent trajectory of imitative policy developments 
noted above is strongly tempered by the evidence presented in the case 
studies. This evidence supports two findings: first, national variation in the 
type and salience of regulatory dynamics persists despite the existence of 
transnationally rooted ‘models’; and secondly, quasi-judicial institutions, 
particularly at the local or national level, are better able to respond to the 
legitimacy challenges raised by disaffected consumers and citizens than 
are regulatory agencies, especially agencies modelled on a transactional 
approach.  
 
The first finding of national variation was summarised at the outset of this 
paper as divergence in the role played by the regulator in each case: 
transactional but marginalised in Bolivia, transactional and politically 
salient in Chile, political and erratically salient in Argentina. The 
difference can partly be accounted for by the larger political context in 
each country: Chile’s stability and foreign-investment-friendly approach, 
provincial-federal conflict in Argentina’s divided state, followed by an 
economic crisis, and Bolivia’s political and social transformation towards 
the left. Whatever the causes of these larger contextual variables,51 they 
                                                 
51 Or the causal effects: it is interesting to note that Evo Morales was involved in protests 
around the Cochabamba dispute and that one of the leading water activists in the conflict 
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show that transformations of the state can constitute new currents in 
globalisation as well as flow from such currents. In particular, the local 
support in Bolivia of a political model of regulation may well have 
implications for future refinements of aan approach to global water 
governance based on participatory democracy. Bolivia’s collaboration 
with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela on the ‘Bolivarian Alternative’ 
supports such an approach for social services in general, including health, 
education and other essential infrastructure apart from water services.  
 
While counterposing the Bolivian story with the Chilean story seems to 
contribute to a sense of polarised conflict between models of global water 
governance, however, certain aspects of Argentina’s story point towards 
compromises that may blend the aspirations of both models, albeit in a 
manner that favours managed liberalisation even if it tips rather more 
towards management than liberalisation. For example, the capacity for 
NGOs and consumer groups to participate in international arbitration 
processes first recognised in one of the Argentinian disputes may create 
incentives for national and local governments to accord a more systematic 
place to consumer and citizen groups in national policymaking processes – 
a trajectory encouraged by national-level litigation and political 
negotiations by those groups using devices like the recurso de proteccion, 
the ombudsman, or human rights provisions in the constitution.  
 
This point leads to the second finding, which is related to the first. The 
case studies also reveal some important contributions that local or national 
institutions can make to temper polarised conflict in ways that build 
bridges between regulatory and citizen space. In no setting can a 
regulatory agency by itself generate such constructive politics. In the case 
of Bolivia, the agency is politically almost irrelevant to the generation of 
these politics; in the case of Argentina, the agency risks sliding into 
unproductive political clientilism yet has moments of productive synergy 
in its interactions with other institutions. In Chile, ‘bureaucrats with an 
entrepreneurial kick’ are constructive up to a point, but limited in the 
scope of their capacity to draw in the interests of ordinary citizens.  
 
                                                                                                                         
over water services in La Paz, Abel Mamani, became the first Water Minister for Bolivia 
under Morales.  
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The lesson here is that even though independent regulatory agencies may 
routinise certain technical issues in water service delivery, they can rarely 
absorb conflict from direct protest. The technical and apolitical nature of 
regulatory discourse is often incommensurable with the value-driven 
nature of direct protest. However, quasi-judicial fora such as ombudsmen 
or small claims tribunals can link synergistically (and usually in 
unintended ways) with regulatory agencies in ways that at least routinise 
conflict, allowing winners and losers to emerge incrementally over time 
rather than intensifying polarisation in high-stakes rulemaking decisions. 
Thus quasi-judicial fora can, up to a point, absorb the ‘missing politics’ in 
regulatory dynamics in constructive ways, as was arguably the case in 
Argentina. In both Chile and Bolivia, the lack of such fora could be seen 
as undermining the overall legitimacy of the water services policy arena, 
but in Bolivia only, such discontent found its outlet in mass mobilisation 
and direct protest. This again links back to the macro-political context for 
each country, which favoured such action in Bolivia but not in Chile.  
 
This finding is limited not only by contingent political contexts, but also 
by whether the quasi-judicial institution is locally embedded. The type of 
legitimacy deficit that bedevilled the water services investment contracts 
explored in this paper is one most intensely felt by local citizens, for 
whom an international investment arbitration forum compounds, rather 
than tempers, any felt injuries. Of course, transnational companies 
investing in longterm service contracts in developing countries may well 
feel the opposite: that local and national judicial and quasi-judicial fora 
lack the requisite legitimacy. In Argentina, the uneasy compromise of 
widening participation rights in international investment arbitration is the 
response. But it is not a response that alters the distributive politics at the 
root of the conflict, and thus there will always necessarily be a degree of 
polarisation around struggles over the appropriate way to govern access to 
water issues.52 But this paper has shown that even seemingly domestic 
regulatory politics in relation to such struggles have a transnational 
dimension. Transnational, however, is precisely neither national nor 
international, external nor internal: it is, rather, a hybrid character 
embedded in coalitions of local, national and international actors. And 
                                                 
52 Note recent move to Water Operator Partnerships (WOPS) and public-public ventures 
as an attempt to build bridges. It is too early to tell if it this will temper the conflicts over 
distribution. 
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importantly, such coalitions are not restricted to those who support the 
managed liberalisation approach to social policy in the context of global 
governance. From the currents of conflict over access to water, flow 
approaches rooted in participatory democracy in all three case studies 
touched upon here, most strongly in Bolivia – and they do so in ways 
which constitute new forms of the transnational within the contours of 
their own states and beyond. 
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